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Disease-Based Limitations On Compulsory Licenses  






Appearing in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND THE WTO (Carlos 
Correa, ed., Edward Elgar, pending 2009). 
 
 
Abstract:  Compulsory licensure is one of the flexibilities retained under TRIPS to permit 
countries to support public health while granting pharmaceutical patents.  The United 
States Government appears to take the position that compulsory licensure and other 
TRIPS flexibilities must be limited to certain infectious diseases, namely AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria.  These proposed limitations are not supported by the text of 
Articles 31 and 31bis of TRIPS or by the negotiating history of the Agreement.  
Introducing disease-based limitations would be unwise, as the developing world is 
undergoing a demographic transition, with increasing shares of its disease burden coming 
from non-infectious diseases.  Public health calls for retaining TRIPS flexibilities in all 
categories of human need. 
 
 
I.  Disease-Based Limitations on Compulsory Licenses in TRIPS Article 31 
 
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement permits a WTO Member country to issue a 
compulsory license of a patent under certain conditions.1  Compulsory licenses are not 
limited to any category of diseases.  The text of Article 31 never mentions any specific 
diseases, a deliberate decision by the negotiating group to avoid any disease-based 
limitation.2  
 
This provision has been misunderstood – perhaps deliberately so - in the pages of the 
WALL STREET JOURNAL and the FINANCIAL TIMES to imply that Article 31 only applies to 
national public health emergencies like HIV/AIDS or only to the least-developed 
countries. When Thailand (a middle-income country) attempted to use TRIPS flexibilities 
                                                
 Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law.  This chapter is a modified and expanded version 
of Should Access to Medicines And TRIPS Flexibilities Be Limited To Specific Diseases?  34 Am. J. L. & 
Med. 279 (2008), used by permission.  An earlier version of this project was submitted to the WHO IGWG 
in 2007: A Request for Clarification Concerning the Proper Scope of the IGWG’s Work to Improve Access 
to Patented Medicines, Submission to the WHO IGWG (30 September 2007). 
1 Section 31 of the TRIPS Agreement does not use the term “compulsory licenses,” preferring the longer 
phrase “other use without authorization of the rights holder.”   Herein, I use the more traditional term 
“compulsory license” or its variations. 
2 See infra nn. 11-28 and text accompanying; Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha 
Round’s public health legacy:  strategies for the production and diffusion of patented medicines under the 
amended TRIPS provisions, 10 J. Int’l Econ. L. 921, 936-37 (2007) (referring to the Doha Declaration). 
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guaranteed and encouraged by the Doha Declaration on drugs for cancer and heart 
disease, a backlash ensued from conservative media, pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
patent blogs, and the governments in the United States and the European Union. 3 The 
WALL STREET JOURNAL editorial page attacked the Thai compulsory licenses as 
“seizures” that cynically distorted WTO rules, while a property-rights activist group 
charged the Thai government with violating global trade rules.4   The FINANCIAL TIMES 
also ran articles critical of Thailand’s moves.5  Abbott, the manufacturer of 
lopinavir/ritonavir, withdrew pending applications for drugs in Thailand, including a 
heat-stable version of an important fixed-dose combination drug for AIDS with particular 
usefulness in a tropical climate.6  The USTR then placed Thailand on the special 301 
“priority watch list,” for alleged violations of intellectual property law, mentioning in 
particular the compulsory license.7   Peter Mandelson, the EU Trade Commissioner at 
that time, also warned Thailand not to issue the compulsory licenses.8  According to the 
FINANCIAL TIMES, his letter to Thailand claimed that compulsory licenses “allow 
countries to waive intellectual property rules to fight emergency health epidemics once 
all other avenues have been explored.”9  This claim is clearly mistaken, and finds almost 
no textual basis in Article 31.10 Nor does anything in Article 31 limit its application only 
                                                
3 See Editorial, Bangkok’s Drug War Goes Global, WALL STREET JOURNAL, (March 7, 2007); M. Vaughan, 
In Clash with Activists, Critics Charge Thailand Violation of Trade Rules, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
WATCH, (March 19, 2007); Editorial, Drugs in Thailand, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 31, 2007) (acknowledging 
that Thailand’s proposal was legal under WTO rules, but questioning the wisdom of issuing a compulsory 
license for a preventative heart disease drug); Amy Kazmin & Andrew Jack, Thai Government to Break 
Drug Patents, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 25, 2007) (“some diplomats questioned whether Bangkok’s breaking 
the Plavix patent would be consistent with Doha’s aim to support licensing as a response to extreme 
emergencies like the Aids epidemic”); Apiradee Treerutkuarkul, Talks With Pharma-Giants Collapse, 
BANGKOK POST (Dec. 18, 2007); Brent Savoie, Thailand’s Test:  Compulsory Licensing In An Era of 
Epidemiologic Transition, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 211 (2007); K. Noonan, Worldwide drug pricing regime in 
chaos (Patent Docs blog, May 9, 2007); K. Noonan, The law of unintended consequences arises in applying 
TRIPS to patented drug protection in developing countries, (Patent Docs Blog, May 1, 2007); see generally 
K. Outterson & A. Kesselheim, Market-based licensing for HPV vaccines in developing countries, 27 
HEALTH AFFAIRS (Jan/Feb 2008) 130-139, at 133-34 [hereinafter, OUTTERSON & KESSELHEIM].   
4 Editorial, Bangkok’s Drug War Goes Global, WALL STREET JOURNAL, (March 7, 2007); M. Vaughan, In 
Clash with Activists, Critics Charge Thailand Violation of Trade Rules, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH, 
(March 19, 2007).  
5 Editorial, Drugs in Thailand, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 31, 2007) (acknowledging that Thailand’s proposal 
was legal under WTO rules, but questioning the wisdom of issuing a compulsory license for a preventative 
heart disease drug); Amy Kazmin & Andrew Jack, Thai Government to Break Drug Patents, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2007) (“some diplomats questioned whether Bangkok’s breaking the Plavix patent would 
be consistent with Doha’s aim to support licensing as a response to extreme emergencies like the Aids 
epidemic”).  
6 Médecins Sans Frontières, Press Release:  Abbott Should Reconsider its Unacceptable Decision to Not 
Sell New Medicines in Thailand, (March 23, 2007).  
7 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 27 (2007) [hereinafter, 
SPECIAL 301 REPORT]. 
8 Andrew Boundsin, Thais warned over drug pricing pressure, FINANCIAL TIMES (August 10, 2007). 
9 Andrew Boundsin, Thais warned over drug pricing pressure, FINANCIAL TIMES (August 10, 2007).  
10 Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s public health legacy:  strategies for the 
production and diffusion of patented medicines under the amended TRIPS provisions, 10 J. Int’l Econ. L. 
921, 949-956 (2007).  Nor was any disease-specific limitation found in the relevant compulsory licensure 
provisions of the Paris Convention.  Paris Convention For the Protection of Industrial Property, Art. 5 A(2) 
(1967) (“Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the grant 
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to the least developed countries.  Compulsory licenses are permitted to all WTO 
Members, not just the poorest. 
 
Those who would circumscribe compulsory licenses draw support from Article 31(b), 
which refers to “situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.”  But this language is not a general 
limitation on compulsory licenses.  Article 31(b) is an exception to the requirement of 
prior negotiation on “reasonable commercial terms.”  The Member may waive the 
negotiation requirement of Article 31(b) if one of three conditions exist:  (1) national 
emergency; (2) other circumstances of extreme urgency; or (3) public non-commercial 
use.  If none of these exceptions apply, the Member must negotiate on reasonable 
commercial terms before proceeding with the compulsory licensure process.  In the case 
of Thailand, if the proposed use is limited to public noncommercial use, then the license 
satisfies the waiver in Article 31(b).  In any event, Thailand does not rely on the waiver, 
since it also claims to have negotiated for two years in an attempt to reach an agreement 
with the patent holder.  If either of these conditions are true, then Thailand need not prove 
the existence of “national emergency” or “other circumstances of extreme urgency” in 
order to issue a compulsory license.   
 
In the negotiating history of Article 31, disease-specific limitations were discussed and 
rejected.  The Secretariat of the Negotiating Group on TRIPS made notes of the TRIPS 
negotiating meetings that were restricted from public distribution, although copies 
circulated informally.  These notes have now been publicly released on the WTO 
website.  The earliest substantive discussion of the scope of compulsory licenses is 
recorded in paragraph 13 of the Notes of the Meetings May 16-19, 1988.11  At that 
meeting, one participant suggested the complete elimination of compulsory licensing: 
“the prohibition of the use of compulsory licenses would be the most trade promoting 
solution, [but] there were many safeguards to limit the possible abuse of compulsory 
licensing that could be considered…”12 Five safeguards were then discussed:   
 
(1) Non-exclusivity (now Article 31(d));  
(2) Limitation to the local market (now “predominately for the supply of the 
domestic market” in Article 31(f), as modified by Article 31bis; 
(3) Judicial review (now Article 31(i) and (j)); 
(4) Limiting compulsory licenses for nonworking to workings that are 
economically feasible in the country (not in Article 31); and 
(5) Patents cannot be revoked for nonworking (not in Article 31).13 
 
If disease-specific limitations were discussed at this meeting, it was not reflected in the 
Notes.  Subsequent TRIPS negotiation meetings focused on potential limitations on the 
purposes for which compulsory licenses could be issued, but again specific diseases were 
                                                                                                                                            
of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights 
conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.”). 
11 MTN.GNG/NG11/7, par. 13 (21 June 1988). 
12 MTN.GNG/NG11/7, par. 13 (21 June 1988). 
13 MTN.GNG/NG11/7, par. 13 (21 June 1988). 
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not mentioned.14  The first recorded discussion of the special health needs of developing 
countries occurred in May 11-12, 1989:   
 
“To address these concerns, a participant suggested … a balance between the 
rights of intellectual property owners and the obligations to be fulfilled by them; 
that technologies notably those required to meet basic nutritional and health needs 
were made available to developing countries on fair and reasonable terms; and 
that effective curbs were imposed on abuses of intellectual property rights by 
rights holders.”15 
 
More substantive discussions occurred in July 12-14, 1989 when some participants 
suggested special and differential treatment for developing countries regarding patents for 
public health.16  Other participants (apparently the US) argued for additional limitations 
on compulsory licensing,17 while India argued for allowing developing countries to 
exclude patenting on pharmaceutical products altogether, a point India eventually 
conceded in Article 27.18  The European Communities supported a stripped down version 
of Article 31, with fewer restrictions on compulsory licenses, but the United States 
strongly opposed that view and argued for additional restrictions on compulsory 
licensing.19   None of these discussions focused on specific diseases. 
 
By the October 1989 meeting, the European Communities had changed course to support 
the US position on compulsory licensing.  This meeting marked the debut of the key 
language requiring “serious efforts … by the applicant in line with normal commercial 
practices to obtain a voluntary license.”20  This text is the genesis of Article 31(b).   
 
The representative of the European Communities also proposed a “positive list” of 
permitted compulsory license grounds, and others also suggested limiting compulsory 
licenses to specific grounds.21  Within a few months, by the April 1990 meeting, the EC 
abandoned their “positive list” proposal as not “useful” and likewise agreed not to specify 
                                                
14 MTN.GNG/NG11/9, pars. 13, 14 (13 Oct. 1988). 
15 MTN.GNG/NG11/12, par. 5 (13 June 1989).  
16 MTN.GNG/NG11/14, pars. 70, 77 (12 Sept. 1989). Substantive policy discussions relating to patents and 
access to medicines occurred in the April 1990 meeting, the 20th meeting of the TRIPS negotiating group.  
MTN.GNG/NG11/20, pars. 29-41 (24 April 1990). Some of the arguments that are now familiar in the 
access to medicines literature were discussed here.  For example, the history of patents in developed 
countries was noted as a recent development, with many developed countries having eschewed patents 
when they were at a “comparable level of development, including patents on pharmaceuticals.” 
MTN.GNG/NG11/20, par. 31 (24 April 1990).  Delegates argued for flexibilities for “essential articles, 
such as medicine and food to be available to the public at reasonable prices.” MTN.GNG/NG11/20, par. 33 
(24 April 1990). A developed country representative responded: “most pharmaceuticals, including the 
overwhelming majority of those on the WHO list of essential drugs, were in the public domain and not 
under patent protection.” MTN.GNG/NG11/20, par. 33 (24 April 1990). The low level of R&D into 
tropical diseases was blamed on the lack of patent protection in developing countries. 
MTN.GNG/NG11/20, par. 33 (24 April 1990).  
17 MTN.GNG/NG11/14, par. 75 (12 Sept. 1989). 
18 MTN.GNG/NG11/14, par. 79.1 (12 Sept. 1989).  
19 MTN.GNG/NG11/14, pars. 83.1 – 83.7 (12 Sept. 1989). 
20 MTN.GNG/NG11/16, par. 22 (4 Dec. 1989); MTN.GNG/NG11/17 par. 39 (Jan. 23, 1990). 
21 MTN.GNG/NG11/16, pars. 22, 23, 33(5) (4 Dec. 1989). 
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the grounds for a compulsory license.22  The final text of Article 31 simply refers to the 
law of the Member for these issues and does not specify grounds.23   
 
The representative of Japan in the December 1989 negotiations initiated the first 
substantive discussion of a disease-specific limitation, namely an “epidemic.”24  The 
context was a discussion of the proper limitations on compulsory licensing in paragraph 
2(1)(i) of the draft text.  The proposal supported by Japan included a phrase “actual peril 
to life of the general public or body thereof.”  In response to questions, the representative 
of Japan said “the proposal was meant to be illustrative of certain situations, including for 
example the actual occurrence of events, such as an epidemic, that were of sufficiently 
serious magnitude to warrant the grant of compulsory licenses.”25  In the next meeting, 
Mexico also proposed grounds including a “critical shortage of a product in the domestic 
market.”26    
 
None of these ideas survived in the Dunkel Draft of December 1991,27 or in the final text 
of Article 31.  The last appearance of limited purposes in Article 31 may be the draft 
dated July 23, 1990, but that draft also included a broad provision permitting compulsory 
licenses for food and medicines.28  The Japanese comment represents the high water mark 
of discussion of disease-specific limitations in the public history of the TRIPS committee 
negotiation, and it was merely a comment in response to a question.  The provision in 
question did not survive in Article 31.  Even so, it was not a limitation to any specific 
disease, but at most a limitation specifying epidemics.  More properly understood, the 
Japanese phrase was focused on events that were actually occurring, as opposed to 
theoretical events.  An epidemic was merely one possible example. 
 
In short, nothing in the negotiating committee history of TRIPS supports a disease-
specific limitation in Article 31.  In fact, the “positive list” approach to the granting of 
compulsory licenses was discussed and rejected. 
 
In addition to Article 31 itself, three other texts should be examined for disease-specific 
restrictions:  the Doha Declaration, the WTO TRIPS Council Decision of August 30, 
2003 (the Council Decision), and Article 31bis, a proposed amendment to the TRIPS 
Agreement.  
 
                                                
22 MTN.GNG/NG11/20, pars. 4, 22 (24 April 1990).  Grounds for compulsory licensure were still being 
discussed as late as November 1990.  MTN.GNG/NG11/27 par. 4 (1 Nov. 1990). 
23 TRIPS Art. 31.   Carlos M. Correa, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  A 
COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 314-15 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2007)  (“WTO Members can 
determine the grounds under which such licenses can be granted.  Said Article [31], as discussed below, 
only stipulates the conditions that governments must comply with.  Paragraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration 
categorically confirmed this interpretation”). 
24 MTN.GNG/NG11/17 par. 39 (Jan. 23, 1990). 
25 MTN.GNG/NG11/17 par. 39 (Jan. 23, 1990); MTN.GNG/NG11/21 par. 52 (22 June 1990). 
26 MTN.GNG/NG11/18 par. 5 (Feb. 27, 1990). 
27 MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991). 
28 W/76  Art. 1A.2, 1B (July 23, 1990). 
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II.  Disease-Based Limitations in the Doha Declaration, the Council Decision, and 
Article 31bis 
 
In the negotiations leading to the Doha Declaration, the US requested an explicit 
“positive list” including only the “Big 3” diseases (HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria).29  This early demand specifically excluded all other epidemics.  After much 
opposition, in an attempt to get some positive list limitation, the US finally proposed a 
broader list of 23 covered diseases, including the additional catch-all category of “other 
epidemics of comparable gravity.”30 This proposal was also not accepted.  The US was 
the last country to assent to the unanimous resolution without their sought-after 
provisions.31 The ultimate language of the Doha Declaration should be understood as a 
defeat for the US positive list approach, and a broad re-affirmation that Article 31 is not 
limited to particular diseases.   
 
The Doha Declaration extended the technical deadline for least-developed countries to 
fully comply with TRIPS, although many were compliant with the pharmaceutical patent 
provisions years in advance.32  Thailand did not rely on this delayed implementation 
provision, as it is not a least-developed country.  The Doha Declaration mentions 
specific diseases in two contexts; neither operates as a disease-based limitation on 
compulsory licensure: 
 
“1.  We recognize the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many 
developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.”33  
 
“5. c.  Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that 
public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria 
and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances 
of extreme urgency.” 34 
 
The Doha Declaration does not limit compulsory licenses to specific diseases or 
epidemics.  Any such interpretation would be odd, since the express purpose of the Doha 
Declaration was to promote access.  Paragraph 1 of the Doha Declaration merely uses 
                                                
29 IP/C/W/340 (March 14, 2002).  Drugs for the poor.  Wash Post p. A32 (Nov. 14, 2002). 
30 See Daniel Gervais, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:  DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 3RD EDITION par. 1.64 
(2008). 
31 GAO Report 07-1198, U.S. TRADE POLICY GUIDANCE ON WTO DECLARATION ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES 
MAY NEED CLARIFICATION 23 (Sept. 2007) [hereinafter, GAO TRADE POLICY REPORT]; Duncan Matthews, 
“Lessons from Negotiating an Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement:  Compulsory Licensing and Access to 
Medicines,” in Guido Westkamp, ed. EMERGING ISSUES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – TRADE, 
TECHNOLOGY AND MARKET FREEDOM:  ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HERCHEL SMITH 227 (UK:  Edward Elgar, 
2007).  Holger Hestermeyer, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO:  THE CASE OF PATENTS AND ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES 263 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2007). 
32 Phil Thorpe, Study on the Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement by Developing Countries 1 (Comm. 
on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Study Paper 7 (circa 2004). 
33 Doha Declaration, at par. 1  WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2. 
34 Doha Declaration, at par. 5.c  WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2. 
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some diseases as illustrative examples of “public health problems afflicting many 
developing countries.”  Paragraph 1 does not purport to limit or interpret Article 31.  The 
core provisions of the Doha Declaration clearly apply to all diseases, such as the 
language of paragraphs 4 and 5(b): 
 
“4.  We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect public health.  Accordingly, while 
reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the 
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to 
promote access to medicines for all.” 
 
“5. b.  Each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to 
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.” 
 
The Doha Declaration clearly supports WTO Members’ rights to utilize TRIPS 
flexibilities – including compulsory licensure and parallel trade – to “protect public 
health” without regard to the type of disease or development level of the country.35 
 
The second specific disease list in the Doha Declaration is found in paragraph 5(c).  
Likewise, it is not a disease-specific limitation on compulsory licenses.  Rather, it 
interprets Article 31(b) to create a safe harbor for situations when the government can 
waive the requirement of advance negotiations on reasonable commercial terms: 
 
“5.c.  Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that 
public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria 
and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances 
of extreme urgency.”36 
 
The first part of paragraph 5(c) grants WTO members autonomy in determining the 
meaning of “national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”  That 
phrase includes two of the three alternative grounds for a waiver of the commercial 
negotiation requirement in Article 31(b).   (The third ground is “public non-commercial 
use”).   The disease list is essentially a safe harbor for national decision-making.  
Arguments that disease-specific limitations are found in paragraph 5(c) of the Doha 
Declaration misinterpret the waiver provisions of Article 31(b).   
 
The well-regarded treatise by Daniel Gervais discusses these provisions of the Doha 
Declaration: 
 
“The list contained in the Declaration is not exhaustive and its emphasis on 
diseases ‘afflicting many developing and least-developed countries’ affords some 
                                                
35 Doha Declaration, at par. 4, 5(b), 5(c), 5(d); GAO TRADE POLICY REPORT, at 11-26.  Paragraph 7 grants 
an additional flexibility to least-developed countries, but that doesn’t constrain existing rights under TRIPS. 
36 Doha Declaration, at par. 5(c).  
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flexibility in relation to diseases that affect those Members particularly.  By 
application of the ejusdem generis interpretation rule, the reference to HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics shows that Members envisaged the 
application of the Decision to serious diseases.  This must be read in context, 
together with paras 5(b) and (c) of the 2001 Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health…”37 
 
Gervais is not asserting disease-specific limitations under Article 31 generally, nor is he 
claiming that the Doha Declaration is limited to specific diseases.  The point is more 
nuanced:  under the Council Decision and Article 31bis, when attempting to define the 
terms “national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,” for the limited 
purpose of the new exception to Article 31(f), then public health crises relating to the 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics are generally understood to 
qualify.38  The WTO has effectively agreed, in advance, that these epidemics will 
presumptively qualify for the new exception to Article 31(f).   
 
His application of the ejusdem generis interpretation rule might also be proper in this 
very limited context (“other epidemics”), as examples of diseases that are understood to 
presumptively qualify under paragraph 5(c) of the Doha Declaration.  In other words, 
Members gain additional flexibility with regard to epidemic diseases, without any 
limitation on the application of Article 31 to other diseases.  Members remain free to 
claim other diseases as the basis for action under Article 31, the Council Decision, and 
Article 31bis, but they do so without the additional presumptions afforded these 
particular epidemic diseases.   
 
Another possible source of confusion arises under paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, 
which subsequently led to the Council Decision and then to proposed Article 31bis.  
Under these provisions, compulsory licenses could be issued for export to least-
developed countries, suspending Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement, which restricts 
compulsory licenses predominantly for domestic use.  Paragraph 6 does not limit 
compulsory licenses to any specific diseases or types of countries.   Gervais also 
comments on these provisions, suggesting,  “that Members envisaged the application of 
the Decision to serious diseases.”39  This “serious diseases” position was discussed in the 
negotiating history of Article 31 when some participants voiced objections to compulsory 
licenses on “lifestyle” medicines.  But these provisions were not adopted in the text of 
Article 31bis, which argues against their inclusion through interpretive principles.  
Furthermore, the Article 31bis process is itself a suspension of Article 31(f).  The 
provisions in the Council Decision and Article 31bis 1(b) are a safe harbor for exports 
that would otherwise violate Article 31(f) rather than a general limitation on compulsory 
licensing.  The fact that some Members voluntarily waived application of Article 31bis to 
                                                
37  Daniel Gervais, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:  DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 3RD EDITION par. 2.288 
(2008).  See also id. at par. 1.64. 
38 Decision on the Implementation of para.6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, adopted by the General Council on August 30, 2003. 
39  Daniel Gervais, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:  DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 3RD EDITION par. 2.288 
(2008). 
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imports by their own countries isn’t relevant to countries like Thailand, except to strongly 
establish that Thailand did not join in this voluntary action. 
 
The TRIPS Agreement is subject to dispute resolution under the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, but the US Government is unlikely to initiate a WTO panel 
against Thailand.  The TRIPS Agreement authorizes members like Thailand to issue 
compulsory licenses for these drugs.40   For all the bluster in the WALL STREET JOURNAL, 
it is clear that the controlling legal texts do not limit the use of TRIPS flexibilities to any 
particular set of diseases. Nor should they.  From the perspective of public health, 
limiting access programs and TRIPS flexibilities to particular diseases would be quite 
dangerous and unnecessary.  Dangerous because the diseases of the world’s rich and poor 
countries are converging, including non-communicative diseases such as heart disease, 
stroke, diabetes, cancer and depression.  Radically cheaper medicines for these conditions 
could significantly improve health in LMICs.  Limitation is also unnecessary because 
proven tools can be deployed to preserve high-income markets while LMICs pursue 
equitable flexibilities.41  
 
Perhaps another factor is at work here as well.  An implicit assumption is that the 
diseases of developing countries are essentially different from diseases in the United 
States or Europe.  Paradigmatic cases include exotic tropical diseases such as Ebola 
Hemorrhagic Fever42 and onchocerciasis (river blindness).  These neglected diseases and 
their victims are so remote from the US experience that special charitable programs seem 
unobjectionable.  But only a very small portion of the disease burden in developing 
countries comes from these exotic tropical neglected diseases.  Drugs produced for high-
income markets can treat most of the global disease burden, such as the pressing need for 
cancer therapies in LMICs, where cancer deaths outnumber AIDS deaths.43  The number 
one cause of death in LMICs isn’t a neglected tropical disease, but a familiar “rich 
country” killer:  heart disease.44 
 
Finally, the implementation of the Council Decision and Article 31bis has introduced 
some disease-specific limitations under national law.  When Canada enacted its Access to 
                                                
40 Indeed, as the GAO reports, the USTR itself concedes the point. GAO TRADE POLICY REPORT, at 48-49.  
The USTR stated that the decision to place Thailand on the Special 301 “priority watch list” was “not 
solely on [Thailand’s] compulsory license decision.” Id., at 49.   See also Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. 
Reichman, The Doha Round’s public health legacy:  strategies for the production and diffusion of patented 
medicines under the amended TRIPS provisions, 10 J. Int’l Econ. L. 921, 949-956 (2007). 
41 For my most recent defense of equitable access in the face of diversion, see OUTTERSON & KESSELHEIM, 
at 136-137.  For an earlier defense set in a broader theoretical context, see Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, at 
261-68.  In the context of adaptive innovation leading to the creation of a distinctive product, diversion is 
much less likely. 
42 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Special Pathogens Branch (2007) available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/spb/mnpages/dispages/ebola.htm.  
43 Institute of Medicine, CANCER CONTROL OPPORTUNITIES IN LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 
(National Academies Press:  2007). 
44 Thomas A. Gaziano, Reducing The Growing Burden of Cardiovascular Disease In The Developing 
World, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 13 (2007); The Center for Global Health and Economic Development, A RACE 
AGAINST TIME:  THE CHALLENGE OF CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (New York:  
Columbia University, 2004). 
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Medicines Regime to permit Paragraph 6 exports, the law limited compulsory licenses to 
specific listed medicines.45  This list has been criticized for its excessive narrowness – 
only 57 drugs or vaccines were included.46  The list is effectively limited to AIDS and 
off-patent medications.  Why any off-patent drugs were included is a mystery.  Many of 
the listed drugs treat AIDS; most of those AIDS drugs are available generically already.  
Almost all of the other drugs on the list are off patent or face legal generic competition in 
a similar form.47  The only patented non-AIDS drugs on the list are eflornithine (for the 
treatment of African sleeping sickness) and levofloxacin (an important antibiotic).  
Others are just curious choices considering the global burden of disease (testosterone 
injection).48  Ivermectin is also listed, despite Merck’s promise to donate it in the river 
blindness campaign.  The very narrow positive list in the Canadian Access to Medicines 
Regime operates as a disease-specific limitation on compulsory licensure for export 
under Canadian law. 
 
III.  The Shifting Global Burden of Disease 
 
To date, the important global legal texts retain broad application to all relevant diseases, 
but the some parties continue to propose disease-specific limitations, most recently in the 
World Health Organization’s Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property (the “WHO IGWG”).49   The WHO IGWG’s task is 
to distill the WHO CIPIH REPORT50 into a global strategy and plan of action.  
 
While pharmaceutical markets vary significantly with the wealth of customers and 
governments, variations in global disease burdens call for careful analysis.  As described 
above, attempts have been made to limit access initiatives and TRIPS flexibilities to 
                                                
45 The Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa Act, House of Commons, 3d Sess., 37th Parliament, 52-53 Eliz. II, 
2004 (Bill C-9) (received Royal Assent on 14 May 2004) [hereinafter CANADIAN ACCESS TO MEDICINES 
REGIME OR CAMR]. The law created a positive list of drugs eligible for compulsory licensure, a procedural 
hurdle not required by the WTO. Id. Sched. 1, available at 
http://www.canlii.org/ca/as/2004/c23/part2620%2Ehtml (visited January 2, 2008).  
46 Jillian C. Cohen-Kohler, Laura C. Esmail, Andrea Perez Cosio, Canada’s Implementation of the 
Paragraph 6 Decision:  Is It Sustainable Public Policy?, 3 GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH (2007) available 
at http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/12 (visited Dec. 17, 2007).  
47 The off-patent drugs include: amphotericin B, azithromycin, beclomethasone/beclometasone, 
ceftazidime, ceftriaxone, ciclosporin(e), ciprofloxacin, daunorubicin, doxorubicin, enalapril, erythromycin, 
etoposide, ibuprofen, isoniazid + pyrazinamide, insulin, ivermectin, levodopa + carbidopa, lithium 
carbonate, metoclopramide, metronidazole, morphine, nifedipine, nitrofurantoin, ofloxacin, potassium 
chloride, rifampin, salbutamol/albuterol, timolol.  Patent status was taken from the US FDA Orange Book, 
available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm (visited January 2, 2008).  
48 Even in the absence of a “national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency” the importing 
country could use the process for “public non-commercial use.”  TRIPS Art. 31bis, sec. 1(b).  Presumably, 
Canadian testosterone injections could qualify for the Paragraph 6 process under the “public non-
commercial use” provision. 
49 WHO Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property, 
A/PHI/IGWG/2/2 (31 July 2007) [hereinafter, the WHO IGWG].  An early form of this article was 
submitted to the WHO IGWG Public Hearing in September 2007, available at 
http://www.who.int/phi/public_hearings/second/contributions_section1/Section1_Kevin_Outterson_Boston
_Uni_Full_Contribution.pdf (visited January 2, 2008). 
50 WHO, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH 13 (2006) [hereinafter, the WHO CIPIH REPORT]. 
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specific diseases or categories, such as the “Big 3” infections diseases (AIDS/HIV, 
malaria and tuberculosis) or “public health emergencies.”  Similarly, global drug 
companies have generally limited their differential pricing policies in LMICs to drugs 
treating AIDS, malaria and a small number of other drugs.51 An implicit assumption is 
that these conditions represent the greatest disease burdens in LMICs.  In fact, these 
infectious diseases are not the most significant drivers of disease burden in LMICs, where 
noncommunicable or chronic diseases play an increasingly significant role.52 
 
The Global Forum for Health Research categorizes diseases and disease burdens in 
LMICs.  Their system focuses on medical categories: 
 
Group 1:  communicable diseases, maternal and perinatal conditions and 
nutritional deficiencies 
 
Group 2:  noncommunicable conditions (NCDs), including cardiovascular 
disease, diabetes, cancer and mental and neurological conditions 
 
Group 3:  injuries, both intentional and unintentional53 
 
In high-income countries, the great majority of burden of disease comes from Group 2; in 
LMICs, Groups 1 and 2 both account for large shares of the burden of disease.54  
Historically, some thought of Group 2 diseases such as heart disease as diseases of 
affluence and Group 1 diseases such as infant mortality and infections as diseases of 
poverty.  But the diseases of affluence and poverty are converging.  As the Global Forum 
for Health Research states:   
 
“A long-standing stereotype has held that noncommunicable conditions are 
‘diseases of affluence’ characteristic of developed countries, while developing 
countries mainly suffer from communicable diseases.  It is clear that this no 
longer applies and that a major epidemiological transition has taken place:  there 
is an almost equal level of BoD due to Group 1 and Group 2 for LMICs and a 
significantly higher rate of DALYs in LMICs due to injuries.”55 
 
The top ten causes of death and burden of disease in LMICs include several conditions 
that are also top killers in high-income countries, in addition to more “traditional” 
diseases of poverty: 
                                                
51 Oxfam, INVESTING FOR LIFE:  MEETING POOR PEOPLE’S NEEDS FOR ACCESS TO MEDICINES THROUGH 
RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS PRACTICES 13-15 (Nov. 2007) (Oxfam Briefing Paper 109). 
52 See, e.g., Roger S. Magnusson, Non-Communicable Diseases and Global Health Governance:  
Enhancing Global Processes to Improve Health Development, 3 GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH (May 22, 
2007) available at http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/2 (visited Dec. 27, 2007). 
53 Global Forum for Health Research, 2 GLOBAL FORUM UPDATE ON RESEARCH FOR HEALTH 10-11 (2005) 
(verbatim); see also Alan Lopez & Colin Mathers, Inequities in Health Status:  Findings From the 2001 
Global Burden of Disease Study, 4 Global Forum Update on Research for Health 163, 164 (2007). 
54 Global Forum for Health Research, 2 GLOBAL FORUM UPDATE ON RESEARCH FOR HEALTH 11 (Fig. 3) 
(2005). 
55 Global Forum for Health Research, 2 GLOBAL FORUM UPDATE ON RESEARCH FOR HEALTH 11 (2005).  
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Table 1.  Burden of Disease in LMICs 
 
 Death (2001)56 Death (2020 est.)57 Burden of disease  
(2001, DALYs)58 
1.  Ischaemic heart disease Ischaemic heart disease Perinatal conditions 
2.  Cerebrovascular disease Cerebrovascular disease Lower respiratory infections 




Ischaemic heart disease 
4.  HIV/AIDS Tuberculosis Cerebrovascular disease 
5.  Perinatal conditions Road traffic accidents HIV/AIDS 
6.  Chronic obstructive  
pulmonary disease 
Lower respiratory infections Diarrhoeal diseases 
7.  Diarrhoeal diseases Trachea, bronchus, and lung 
cancers 
Unipolar depressive disorders 
8.  Tuberculosis Stomach cancer Malaria 
9.  Malaria Diarrhoeal disease Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
10.  Road traffic accidents HIV/AIDS Tuberculosis 
 
Noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) are an increasingly significant problem in the 
developing world.59  As Lopez and Mathers note: 
 
“Surprisingly, almost 50% of the adult disease burden in low- and medium-
income countries is now attributable to noncommunicable disease.  Population 
ageing and changes in the distribution of risk factors have accelerated the 
epidemic of noncommunicable disease in many developing countries.”60 
 
The WHO CIPIH REPORT took a different taxonomic path to describe the global burden 
of disease, following the terminology of the Commission on Macroeconomics & Health 
                                                
56 Alan Lopez & Colin Mathers, Inequities in Health Status:  Findings From the 2001 Global Burden of 
Disease Study, 4 GLOBAL FORUM UPDATE ON RESEARCH FOR HEALTH 169 (Table 2) (2007). 
57 Shah Ebrahim and Liam Smeeth, Non-Communicable Diseases in Low and Middle-Income Countries:  A 
Priority or a Distraction?,  34 INT’L. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 961, 962 (Table 2) (2005). 
58 Alan Lopez & Colin Mathers, Inequities in Health Status:  Findings From the 2001 Global Burden of 
Disease Study, 4 GLOBAL FORUM UPDATE ON RESEARCH FOR HEALTH 171-72 (Tables 7 & 8) (2007) 
(correcting numbering errors in original chart). 
59 See, e.g. the special issue of THE LANCET in December 2007 devoted to the burden of chronic diseases, 
with several articles focusing upon LMICs.  Dele O Abegunde et al., The Burden and Costs of Chronic 
Diseases in Low-Income and Middle-Income Countries, 370 THE LANCET 1929-38 (2007); Stephen S Lim, 
et al., Prevention of Cardiovascular Disease in High-Risk Individuals in Low-Income and Middle-Income 
Countries:  Health Effects and Costs, 370 THE LANCET xxx (published online Dec. 5, 2007); Robert 
Beaglehole, Shah Reddy, Janet Voûte, Steve Leeder, Prevention of Chronic Diseases:  A Call To Action, 
370 THE LANCET xxx (2007).  For a somewhat contrarian view, see Shah Ebrahim and Liam Smeeth, Non-
Communicable Diseases in Low and Middle-Income Countries:  A Priority or a Distraction?,  34 INT’L. J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY, at 961 (2005); but see Kathleen Strong, Colin Mathers, Joanne Epping-Jordan, and Robert 
Beaglehole, Preventing Chronic Disease:  A Priority For Global Health, INT’L. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 492 
(2006) (letter responding to the Ebrahim & Smeeth article).  The WHO CIPIH REPORT strongly noted the 
growing rate of noncommunicable disease.  WHO CIPIH REPORT, at 2-5, 44. 
60 Alan Lopez & Colin Mathers, Inequities in Health Status:  Findings From the 2001 Global Burden of 
Disease Study, 4 GLOBAL FORUM UPDATE ON RESEARCH FOR HEALTH at 172. 
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(CMH).61   The CMH and the WHO CIPIH Report categorized diseases with a market-
based approach, according to their intrinsic appeal to global capitalism, and in particular 
the markets for innovation and medicine. 
 
 Type I Disease Innovations 
 
Type I diseases occur in high-income countries.  The purchasing power of the high-
income countries drives innovation for Type I diseases.  Examples include cardiovascular 
disease, stroke, cancer, depression, and diabetes.  These diseases may also be prevalent in 
LMICs,62 but the defining characteristic of Type I diseases is a strong market demand for 
treatment of high-income patients.  SARS and pandemic influenza are also Type I disease 
markets.  Innovation in Type I diseases can be sufficiently supported by high-income 
markets alone. 
 
Some Type I diseases disproportionately affect people in LMICs.  Take the example of 
cervical cancer. The WHO Commission listed cervical cancer as a Type I disease.63  In 
high-income countries, deaths from cervical cancer are relatively rare due to expensive 
population screening and treatment.  About 260,000 women in developing countries die 
from cervical cancer each year,64 exceeding the deaths from all diseases in the tropical-
disease cluster.65  A highly effective vaccine is now available to prevent most cases of 
cervical cancer,66 but the price – US$360 per person – exceeds the per capita annual 
health budgets for most of the women worldwide who need it.67 A relatively small 
number of deaths in high-income countries led to these two HPV vaccines that hold great 
promise in LMICs as well.  These vaccines could be provided generically to the poorest 
without undermining optimal innovation.  The deaths of less than 17,000 women per year 
in wealthy countries offered sufficient financial rewards to prompt both Merck and 
GlaxoSmithKline to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to bring HPV vaccines to 
market.  The deaths of more than 222,000 poor women per year may have provided 
moral, scientific or humanitarian incentives to create HPV vaccines, but the potential 
financial rewards were modest, since these women can’t afford it.68  Merck has 
                                                
61 WHO CIPIH REPORT, at 13. 
62 See Bradly Condon & Tapen Sinha, Global Diseases, Global Patents and Differential Treatment in WTO 
Law:  Criteria for Suspending Patent Obligations in Developing Countries, NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 25-28 
(2005).  
63 WHO CIPIH REPORT, at 14 (Tab. 1.3). 
64 F. Kamangar, G.M. Dores, & W.F. Anderson, Patterns of Cancer Incidence, Mortality, and Prevalence 
Across Five Continents:  Defining Priorities to Reduce Cancer Disparities in Different Geographic 
Regions of the World, 24 J.  CLIN. ONCOLOGY 2137-2150 (2006). 
65 C.D. Mathers, A.D. Lopez, & C.J.L. Murray, GLOBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE AND RISK FACTORS (Table 
3B.1) (Oxford/World Bank, 2006). 
66 D.M. Harper, E. L. Franco, C.M. Wheeler, A. B. Moscicki, B. Romanowski, et al., Sustained Efficacy Up 
To 4.5 Years of a Bivalent L1 Virus-Like Particle Vaccine Against Human Papillomavirus Types 16 and 
18: Follow-Up From a Randomised Control Trial, 367 THE LANCET 1247-55 (2006). 
67 OUTTERSON & KESSELHEIM, at 130 and ffg.  
68 Id.  
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announced an equitable access program,69 and some limited donations, but the scope of 
the program remains unknown at the present.70 
 
 Type III Disease Innovations 
 
Type III diseases are overwhelmingly or exclusively incident in developing countries.  
Little or no global commercial market exists for Type III diseases.  Examples include 
onchocerciasis (river blindness), leishmaniasis (kala-azar), Chagas disease, and African 
sleeping sickness.  
 
Many have recognized the market failures inherent in Type III diseases.71 For these 
diseases, normal market conditions will be inadequate to stimulate sufficient R&D.  
Impoverished sick people are not attractive markets for global for-profit R&D 
programs.72  Type III disease innovation will require substantial non-market incentives, 
such as public private product development partnerships73 and market-making devices 
such as Advanced Market Commitments74 or patent prizes.75 Others look to non-market 
incentives such as grants and government-sponsored research.76  Occasionally proposals 
are coupled with an expansion of IP rights in poor countries,77 or a choice between 
exercising IP rights in either developed or developing countries, but not both.78  
Expanded IP rights are an unnecessary and unwelcome addition for neglected disease 
research.  Expansion of IP rights will not create incentives in the absence of money to 
                                                
69 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation Press Release, Cervical Cancer Vaccine Project (2006) available at  
http://www.path.org/files/RH_cc_vacc_proj_fs_update.pdf (accessed 16 August 2007). 
70 Merck Press Release, Merck To Donate Three Million Doses of Gardasil, Its Cervical Cancer Vaccine, 
to Support Vaccination Programs in Lowest Income Nations, (Sept. 26, 2007).  Three million doses will 
vaccinate 1 million women, a very small percentage of the need.   
71 WHO CIPIH Report, at 22 (“as is the case for diseases affecting millions of poor people in developing 
countries, patents are not a relevant factor or effective in stimulating R&D and bringing new products to 
market.”); see also Carl Nathan, Aligning Pharmaceutical Innovation With Medical Need, 13 NATURE 
MEDICINE 304-308 (2007).  For a review of the literature, see Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, at 244-50. 
72 See, e.g. Médicins Sans Frontiéres, FATAL IMBALANCE:  THE CRISIS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
FOR DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES (September 2001). 
73 Mary Moran, et al., The New Landscape of Neglected Disease Drug Development (2005) available at 
www.wellcome.ac.uk.  
74 Michael Kremer and R. Glennerster, STRONG MEDICINE:  CREATING INCENTIVES FOR PHARMACEUTICAL 
RESEARCH ON NEGLECTED DISEASES (2004). 
75 Aiden Hollis, AN EFFICIENT REWARD SYSTEM FOR PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION (July 2, 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  [check to see if it is published now] 
76 Tim Hubbard and James Love, A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D, 2 PLOS BIOLOGY 
0147-50 (Feb. 2004); but see Joseph DiMasi and Henry G. Grabowski, Patents and R&D Incentives: 
Comments on the Hubbard and Love Trade Framework For Financing Pharmaceutical R&D 2 (2003) 
available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/news/en/Submission3.pdf.  
77 Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 Chi. J. Int’l. 
L. 47, 56 (2002); Neglected Diseases:  Towards Policies Without Borders, 262 OECD OBSERVER (July 
2007). 
78 Jean O. Lanjouw & William Jack, Trading Up: How Much Should Poor Countries Pay to Support 
Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 4 CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 1-8 (2004), available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/2842/.  
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buy the product. These diseases are neglected due to the poverty of the afflicted, not the 
lack of IP rights.79  
 
While Type III diseases are significant, we should note that total global deaths from the 
tropical-disease cluster in 2001 were only 128,000 people.80  Residents of LMICs suffer 
from higher infectious disease burdens, but much of the DALYs lost stems from 
noncommunicable diseases, injuries, and communicable diseases other than the tropical 
and neglected disease cluster.81  
 
 Type II Disease Innovations 
 
Type II diseases occupy an intermediate category, sharing some characteristics of the 
other categories. LMICs suffer a disproportionately large burden from Type II diseases.    
Tuberculosis and malaria were once Type I diseases, but are now classified as Type II by 
the WHO after virtual eradication of malaria in the US and Europe, and a significantly 
lower disease burden from tuberculosis in high-income countries.  Malaria is classified as 
Type II rather than Type III because it retains a small but significant financial footprint in 
the high-income countries to meet the needs of the military and international travelers.  If 
multiple-drug resistant and extremely-drug resistant tuberculosis spread significantly in 
high-income countries, tuberculosis may regain Type I status.  
 
Innovation in Type II diseases also occupies an intermediate category.  In many cases, 
innovation for high-income markets will be sufficient to create the necessary drugs.  Such 
was the case with AIDS and the existing treatments for malaria and tuberculosis.  But the 
global medical burden of malaria and tuberculosis has outmatched the innovation spurred 
by relatively modest high-income country markets.  Type II diseases will require 
additional non-market incentives to fully correlate global need with innovation 
incentives.82  
 
The WHO Commission classified AIDS as a Type II disease,83 but that appears to be a 
debatable choice.  AIDS is perhaps better classified as a Type I disease.  While the 
greatest burden of AIDS disease falls outside of high-income countries, more than 2 
million people are living with HIV in high-income countries84 and infection rates are 
rising.85  This high-income patient base is more than sufficient to spur innovation.  The 
AIDS cases in the US and Europe sparked an avalanche of research, even before the true 
scope of the global crisis was known.  AIDS may be considered a Type I disease at 
present, with the exception of adaptive research. 
                                                
79 WHO CIPIH REPORT, at Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, at 22, 244-50; Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, at 244-60. 
80 Mathers, et al., GLOBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE AND RISK FACTORS, at Table 3B.1. 
81 WHO CIPIH REPORT, at 3-4, Table 1.1 & 1.2. 
82 See, e.g. Carl Nathan, Aligning Pharmaceutical Innovation With Medical Need, 13 NATURE MEDICINE 
304-308 (2007).  
83 WHO CIPIH REPORT, at 14.  
84 UNAIDS, FACT SHEET:  KEY FACTS BY REGION – 2007 AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE (Nov. 2007) (estimating 
that 2.1 million people are living with HIV in 2007 in North America, Western and Central Europe).  
85 Gardiner Harris, Figures on H.I.V. Rate Expected to Rise, NY TIMES (Dec. 2, 2007) (reporting that 
estimates on US infection rates may be 50% higher than previously thought). 
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Adaptive Innovations for Type I Diseases 
 
Additional incentives may be required to adapt Type I innovations to developing country 
conditions.86  Heat-stable formulations and fixed-dose combinations87 are examples of 
adaptive innovations for a Type I disease (AIDS).  Simpler and cheaper diagnostics are 
required for resource-constrained settings.  Geographic variations in HPV subtype 
incidence might require additions to the cervical cancer vaccines.88  All of these are 
examples of adaptive innovation for Type I diseases.  In the language of the WHO DRAFT 
GLOBAL STRATEGY (2007), these are “needs of developing countries in relation to Type I 
diseases.”89  Some of this adaptive innovation may come from drug companies located in 
developing countries, where cost structures are lower and researchers may be closer to 
the ground.90  Other adaptive innovations may require non-market incentives, similar to 
other neglected disease issues. 
 
 Important Distinctions Between Markets for Innovation and Medicine 
 
The WHO typology is helpful for analyzing differences in the markets for innovation and 
medicine between high-income countries and LMICs.  Disease-specific incentives are 
required for innovation market failures in Type II and III diseases, but limitations are not 
appropriate for access programs and TRIPS flexibilities.  The relevant factors are 
summarized in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2.  Markets for innovation and medicines, by disease type and income level. 
 
 
 Innovation Market Medicine Market 
Type I   
 - HICs High-income country purchasing power 
drives the market (ex: Lipitor for high 
cholesterol). 
 
Innovation follows purchasing power rather 
than medical need (ex:  additional life style 
and me-too drugs rather than a first-in-class 
Gram-negative antibiotic). 
Patent protection and sophisticated branding 
and marketing yield high drug prices.   
 
The impact of high prices is ameliorated by 
private and social insurance mechanisms, 
relatively high per capita incomes, and (in 
some cases) government monopsony 
procurement. 
 - LMICs Adaptive R&D may be needed to account 
for resource-constrained settings (ex. non-
refrigerated vaccines, polyvalent HPV 
vaccines, fixed-dose combinations).   
 
Patent-based pricing denies access to the 
majority of direct purchasers.  Robust generic 
competition would drive prices closer to 
marginal cost (ex. unlicensed AIDS drugs) 
 
                                                
86 WHO CIPIH REPORT, at 16-19, 44. 
87 Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, at 234. 
88 N. Munoz N, et al., Against Which Human Papillomavirus Types Shall We Vaccinate and Screen?  The 
International Perspective, 111 INT’L. J. CANCER 278-85 (2004). 
89 WHO, DRAFT GLOBAL STRATEGY AND PLAN OF ACTION ON PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  PROGRESS TO DATE IN DRAFTING GROUPS A AND B (14 Dec. 2007) 
(A/PI/IGWG/2/Conf.Paper No.1 Rev.1) [hereinafter, WHO DRAFT GLOBAL STRATEGY (2007)]. 
90 WHO CIPIH REPORT, at 45. 
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Regional companies may be able to supply 
some adaptive R&D.  The balance must be 
provided through non-market incentives. 
LMIC governments and donors have limited 
ability to subsidize access (cf: Thailand & 
Brazil’s AIDS programs). 
Type II   
 - HICs Largely ignored by high-income markets, 
except by tourists, military and other 
modest markets (ex:  prophylaxis for 
malaria). 
Patented Type II innovative medicines are 
generally limited to HIC citizens who are 
residents in LMICs (ex: military, tourists, 
expats, wealthy local elites). 
 -LMICs Adequate levels of innovation require 
additional R&D support from non-market 
incentives (ex:  malaria vaccine) 
LMIC governments and donors have limited 
ability to subsidize access.  Best medical 
practice may require significant subsidies to 
prevent resistance to communicable diseases 
(ex:  subsidies for ACTs for malaria).  
Type III   
 - HICs No market in HICs.   No medical need in HICs. 
 - LMICs These very neglected diseases require non-
market incentives to support innovation.  
Significant unmet medical need in LMICs. 
 
 
IV.  Disease-Specific Limitations in the WHO IGWG 
 
With this background, we now turn to the recent discussions within the WHO IGWG 
concerning disease-specific limitations.  The December 14, 2007 draft of the WHO 
DRAFT GLOBAL STRATEGY (2007)91 frequently uses the following disease-limiting phrase 
or its permutations:  “diseases which disproportionately affect developing countries.”92  
The phrase was prominently discussed in the WHO CIPIH REPORT,93 and was mentioned 
in the World Health Assembly Resolution that established the IGWG.94   The phrase is 
occasionally used as an apparent synonym for Type II and III diseases. 
 
 The US Position 
 
The United States Government appears to consider the phrase as a limitation on access 
programs.  In the US COMMENTS to the WHO ELEMENTS OF A GLOBAL STRATEGY (2006), 
the United States claimed that the IGWG’s mandate was limited to Type II and III 
diseases: 
 
“The IGWG should not consider Recommendation 2.4 as the focus of its 
work should be on diseases that disproportionately affect developing 
countries, more commonly referred to as Type II and Type III diseases.”95  
 
                                                
91 WHO DRAFT GLOBAL STRATEGY (2007), at  xxx.   An earlier draft is:  WHO, ELEMENTS OF A GLOBAL 
STRATEGY AND PLAN OF ACTION, A/PHI/IGWG/1/5 (8 December 2006) [hereinafter, WHO ELEMENTS OF 
A GLOBAL STRATEGY (2006)].  
92 WHO DRAFT GLOBAL STRATEGY (2007), at 3, par. 3 (consensus text), par. 4 (bracketed text, consensus 
pending decision by USA), at 4, par. 13 (with bracketed text), par. 14 a) (consensus text), par. 14 b) 
(consensus text, except for omitted footnote).  
93 WHO CIPIH REPORT. 
94 WHA 59.24. 
95 US COMMENTS, at 2.  
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The United States was commenting on Recommendation 2.4 from the WHO CIPIH 
Report, which explicitly included Type I diseases in its ambit: 
 
“When addressing the health needs of people in developing countries, it is 
important to seek innovative ways of combating Type I diseases, as well 
as Type II and Type III diseases.  Governments and funders need to assign 
higher priority to combating the rapidly growing impact of Type I diseases 
in developing countries, and, through innovation, to finding affordable and 
technologically appropriate means for their diagnosis, prevention and 
treatment.”96 
 
Other actions by the US Government have attempted to limit IGWG consideration of 
TRIPs flexibilities, especially with regard to Type I diseases.  For example, the WHO 
CIPIH REPORT97 and the World Health Assembly Resolution 59.2498 supported the use of 
TRIPS flexibilities by developing countries.  The WHO ELEMENTS OF A GLOBAL 
STRATEGY (2006) included the following “areas for action:” 
 
“6(a) enact legislation in developed and developing countries for 
application of the flexibilities provided for in TRIPS and other 
international agreements” 
 
“6(f) assure that bilateral trade agreements do not seek to incorporate 
“TRIPS-plus” protection in ways that might reduce access to medicines in 
developing countries” 
 
“6(i) focus on specific aspects of the intellectual property system, such as 
test data exclusivity, “me-too” patents, and patent linkages” 
 
“7(i) take necessary legislative steps in developed countries, and other 
countries with manufacturing and export capacity, to allow compulsory 
licensing for  export consistent with the flexibilities provided for in 
TRIPS” 
 
“7(j) provide in national legislation for measures to encourage generic 
entry on patent expiry, such as the “early working” exception, and more 
generally policies that support greater competition between generics, 
whether branded or not, as an effective way to enhance access by 
improving affordability; restrictions should not be placed on the use of 
generic names”99 
 
The US COMMENTS requested that these discussions of TRIPS flexibilities be excluded 
                                                
96 WHO CIPIH REPORT, at 48 (Recommendation 2.4). 
97 WHO CIPIH REPORT, at 22. 
98 WHA 59.24, at par. 2(4). 
99 WHO ELEMENTS OF A GLOBAL STRATEGY (2006), at 6-8. 
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from the WHO IGWG process:100    
 
“Accordingly, the IGWG should not consider Subsection (a) of Paragraph 
Six of the document.  The WHO Secretariat should not expand its work on 
matters better addressed by another international organization.  Therefore, 
the IGWG should not consider Subsections (f) and (i) of Paragraph Six of 
the document, because they more appropriately fit within the scope and 
mandate of the WTO and WIPO.”101 
 
“While Subparagraph (j) of Paragraph Seven is important when balanced 
with incentives to develop new drugs, neither subparagraph (i) or (j) are 
appropriate areas of action for the WHO Secretariat; thus the IGWG 
should not consider them.”102 
 
The US Comments are thus making a narrow, technocratic argument that the WHO is an 
inappropriate forum for discussing the intellectual property rights issues relating to access 
to medicines.  They are trying to prevent discussion in a forum that might actually give 
some weight to global health.  This argument ignores the history of the IGWG process, 
which was designed to offer a balanced, integrated analysis of intellectual property rights, 
innovation and public health.   Each step of this process has highlighted all three issues:  
The WHO Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health; 
the WHO CIPIH Report entitled PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION & INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS; and the WHO IGWG ON PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.   The WHO is not claiming exclusive jurisdiction over these 
issues, merely the opportunity to speak to issues which impact global public health.  
 
 Disease-Specific Limitations Are Not Appropriate 
 
Nothing in the TRIPs Agreement or the Doha Declaration limits access programs or 
TRIPS flexibilities to Type II and III diseases.  Neither does the WHO CIPIH REPORT, 
which cannot be read as arguing for any such restriction.   
 
The phrase “diseases which disproportionately affect developing countries” is best 
understood as an explanation for why the market has failed to produce medicines for 
neglected (Type II) or very neglected (Type III) diseases:  diseases which occur 
disproportionately in poor people in LMICs are not an attractive market for the patent-
based drug industry.  As the WHO CIPIH REPORT concluded:   
 
“Too few R&D resources are directed to the health needs of developing countries.  
In the private sector, companies do not have the incentive to devote adequate 
resources to develop products specifically adapted to the needs of developing 
countries, because profitability is mainly to be found in rich country markets.  The 
                                                
100 US COMMENTS, at 4-6, pars. 7-8.  The US COMMENTS suggest that the WTO and WIPO are the better 
fora.  
101 US COMMENTS, at 5, par. 6. 
102 US COMMENTS, at 5, par. 7. 
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great majority of health research funded by the public sector, takes place in 
developed countries, and its priorities principally reflect their own disease burden, 
resource position and social and economic circumstances.”103   
 
Difficulties with the US position are made more evident when one attempts to construct a 
list of qualifying diseases. The adverb “disproportionately” appears to require that 
incidence on a per capita basis be significantly higher.  Surely the list includes all Type 
III diseases, including the very neglected tropical diseases, for by definition the per 
capita incidence is almost exclusively in LMICs.  Similarly, the largest Type II diseases 
such as malaria and tuberculosis appear to qualify.  For all of these diseases, markets are 
unable to stimulate the R&D required for global health.    
 
AIDS presents a more troublesome case.  The incidence and burden of AIDS falls 
disproportionately on sub-Saharan Africa, but the same may not hold true for India or 
China.  As discussed above, AIDS may not be properly classified as a Type II disease at 
all, and its incidence is rising in the United States.104  
 
Other infectious diseases are quite common in LMICs, and result in a substantial burden 
of disease there.  In general, the incidence of infectious diseases falls disproportionately 
in LMICs, but significant medical need exists also in high-income countries for many 
infectious diseases.105  
 
Most noncommunicable or chronic diseases would probably not qualify.  While heart 
disease, depression, stroke, and diabetes are certainly major contributors to the burden of 
disease in LMICs, they do not impose a disproportionately higher per capita burden.  If 
the phrase “diseases which disproportionately affect developing countries” is considered 
a limitation on access programs and TRIPS flexibilities, then almost all chronic and 
noncommunicable diseases must be excluded.   
 
Clearly, this is not an acceptable result.  This interpretation is without support in the 
WHO CIPIH REPORT, and is at odds with the mandate of the WHO IGWG.  The Report 
does not limit access programs or TRIPs flexibilities to specific diseases.  In fact, it 
recommended exactly the opposite.  Recommendations 4.13 to 4.27 are primarily 
concerned with encouraging developing countries to take advantage of TRIPS 
flexibilities and other laws in order to protect public health, without any limitations as to 
disease.106  Recommendation 4.7 specifically includes noncommunicable diseases:   
 
                                                
103 WHO CIPIH REPORT, at 172. 
104 See supra, nn. 83-85 and text accompanying. 
105 See, e.g., E. Klein, D.L. Smith, R. Laxminarayan, Hospitalizations and Deaths Caused By Methicillin-
Resistant Staphylococcus aureus, United States, 1999-2005, 13 EMERGING INF. DIS. 1840-46 (2007); RM 
Klevens, et al., Invasive Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Infections in the United States, 298 J. 
AM. MED. ASSN. 1763-71 (2007). 
106 WHO CIPIH REPORT, at 180-82. 
Draft 5/19/09  Page 21 of 21   
“4.7 For noncommunicable diseases, governments and companies should consider 
how treatments, which are widely available in developed countries, can be made 
more accessible for patients in developing countries.”107  
 
The phrase is relevant only as a descriptive term, identifying innovation market failures:  
patent-based pharmaceutical innovation doesn’t work for diseases which 
disproportionately affect developing countries.  Global markets under perform 
commercial research into Type II, Type III diseases and adaptive research for Type I 
innovations for resource-constrained settings.   No substantial market in high-income 
countries exists for these disease conditions, necessitating various non-market 
mechanisms in order to facilitate innovation.  By definition, these conditions 
disproportionately affect developing countries; otherwise they would be Type I 
innovations. 
 
But the innovation gap is not the only problem facing the IGWG.   Its terms of reference 
also include ensuring equitable access to patented innovations treating all diseases, 
including Type I, II and III diseases.  The market for medicines and the market for 









V.  Conclusion 
 
The pharmaceutical IP system works well in high-income countries with social insurance.  
It does not work for the poor in low- and middle-income countries.  Governments should 
be free to fully utilize all TRIPS flexibilities to protect the health of their citizens, without 
regard to the type of disease.  In particular, WTO Members must be permitted to confront 
the growing burden of chronic diseases by using TRIPS flexibilities for any type of 
disease, including, without limitation, Type I conditions such as cancer and 
cardiovascular diseases. 
 
From the initial negotiations that led to the TRIPS Agreement until today, some 
governments – particularly the US government – have attempted to limit the flexibilities 
afforded to WTO Members under Article 31.  This activity continues today in the WHO 
IGWG process, now using the phrase “diseases disproportionately affecting developing 
countries.”  Limiting TRIPS flexibilities to specific diseases is not supported under 
Article 31, the Doha Declaration, the Council Decision, the WHO Commission Report, or 
by the shifting global burden of disease.   
                                                
107 WHO CIPIH REPORT, at 180. 
108 WHA 59.24 par. 2(3).  
